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EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-ADMISSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT REPORTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL BusINESS REcoRDs Acr-The United States, as assignee of a civilian seaman's claim, brought an action against the defendant for injuries
received when the seaman slipped on a walkway which the defendant had
contracted to maintain in good repair.1 At the trial plaintiff sought to
introduce into evidence a report compiled by the seaman's superior, such
report being required to accompany the seaman's claim for compensation
from the Government.2 Admission of the report under the Federal Business Records Act3 was denied, and the Government's case was thereby
materially weakened. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict for the defendant. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded for a new trial. Two
of the judges, employing different rationales, concluded that the report
was admissible,4' while the third, though concurring in the decision to
1 The seaman was compensated under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act § 1,
!19 Stat. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1958). He then assigned his claim
against the defendant to the United States as required by the statute. Section 26, 39
Stat. 747 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 776 (1958).
2 Federal Employees' Compensation Act § 24, 39 Stat. 747 (1916), as amended, 5
u.s.c. § 774 (1958).
s Section 1, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
4' Judge Waterman held that the report was admissible because the circumstances of
its compilation indicated that it was sufficiently trustworthy. Principal case at 797. Judge
Clark, on the other hand, rejected the trustworthiness test followed by Judge Waterman,
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grant a new trial, disagreed with the determination as to the admissibility
of the report.5 United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators,
Inc., 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962).
At common law two principal exceptions to the hearsay rule were
developed which made possible the admission of business records into
evidence.6 The older of these exceptions was the "shopbook rule," which
facilitated the introduction of the small tradesman's shop records into
evidence, thus lessening the burden imposed on him by his incompetency
as a witness resulting from his interest as a party. The second exception
provided that records made in the regular course of business would be
admissible when the entrant was unavailable to testify in person.7 As the
common law developed, these exceptions became so circumscribed that it
was almost impossible in many instances for litigants to use their business
records as evidence.8 The need for legislative reform stimulated the drafting of a model act by the Commonwealth Fund Committee.9 The Model
Act has been adopted with minor changes by seven states,10 as well as by
the federal government.11 In addition, it became the basis for the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act, 12 which has been adopted in twentyfive states. 13
In enacting the Federal Business Records Act, Congress intended to
create a liberal and uniform rule throughout the federal judicial system
which would facilitate the admission of voluminous account books and
and concluded that the statutory language required the admission of all records once
their regularity was established, regardless of the inherent trustworthiness of the report.
Principal case at 799.
5 Judge Moore agreed with Judge Waterman that trustworthiness was an essential
factor to be considered in determining admissibility. However, he thought that the
trial court should be given a chance to pass on the issue of trustworthiness before the
court of appeals decided it. Principal case at 801.
6 See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1518 (3d ed. 1940).
7 See generally Polasky &: Paulson, Business Entries, 4 UTAH L. REv. 327 (1954); 47
HAR.v. L. REV. 1044 (1934).
s See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 122 (1921). See also 5
WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1520.
o MORGAN et al., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE; SOME PROPOSALS FOR !TS REFORM 63 (1927).
10 A.LA. CODE tit. 7, § 415 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-180 (1960); ME. REv.
STAT. ch. 113, § 133 (1954); Mn. ConE ANN. art. 35, § 59 (1958); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233,
§ 78 (1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-12 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-19-13 (1957).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1958). "In any court of the United States and in any court
established by Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry
in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or
event, if made in the regular course of business, and if it was the regular course of
business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event within a reasonable time thereafter.
"All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record .•. may be shown
to affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility."
12 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 299 (1957).
13 See id. at 297. See also Green, The Model and Uniform Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 TuL. L. REv. 49 (1956); Norville, The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 27 ORE. L. REV. 188 (1948).
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other business records into evidence in the absence of direct testimony
by the entrant. 14 The language of the statute does not specify whether or
not accident reports are also admissible, and Congress intimated no opinion
on the subject in its committee reports.15 Admission of accident reports
under the Federal Business Records Act was considered by the Supreme
Court for the first and only time in Palmer v. Hoffman. 16 In that case
the Court affirmed a decision by the Second Circuit that an accident report
made by defendant's employee, a railroad engineer, was inadmissible under
the statute.1'1 Although this report was compiled pursuant to a routine
company policy and in the presence of an official of the Massachusetts
Public Utilities Commission, the court of appeals stated that its compilation was surrounded by circumstances which were "dripping with motivation to misrepresent." 18 The court did, however, conclude that the
report was made in the regular course of the railroad company's business.
By deciding that the report was made in the regular course of business,
while at the same time refusing to allow its admission into evidence, the
Second Circuit placed itself in the position of deciding on admissibility
in direct contravention to the express statutory language. 19 In affirming,
the Supreme Court avoided this dilemma by holding that the report was
not made in the "regular course of business" because it was compiled primarily in anticipation of litigation, rather than for use in the operation
of the railroad. The Court also noted that the original common-law business records exception had been created on the premise that such records
were inherently trustworthy. There is some indication in the opinion that
circumstances which suggest a lack of trustworthiness may have a bearing
on the determination of whether a report is "regular" within the meaning
of the statute. Thus, the Palmer decision effected an interpretation of the
Federal Business Records Act which would appear to be consistent with
the historical common-law business records exception. It is not so clear,
however, that the decision was in accord with the intentions of the framers
of the Model Act.2°
S. REP. No. 1965, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
At common law it was generally held that accident reports did not come within
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See Davis v. Michigan Cent. R.R.,
294 III. 355, 128 N.E. 539 (1920); Bloom v. Union Ry., 165 App. Div. 257, 150 N.Y. Supp.
779 (1914); Quigley v. Gulf C. &: S.F.R.R., 142 S.W. 633 (Te.-..:. Civ. App. 1911); Conner
v. Seattle, R. &: S.R.R., 56 Wash. 310, 105 Pac. 644 (1909). But see O'Driscoll v. Lynn &:
B.R.R., 180 Mass. 187, 62 N.E. 3 (1902); Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45,
200 N.W. 922 (1924); Lebrun v. Boston &: M.R.R., 83 N.H. 293, 142 Atl. 128 (1928).
16 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
17 Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942).
18 Id. at 991.
19 See note 11 supra. Once a report is established as being in the regular course of
business, other factors may be deemed to affect only its weight but not its admissibility.
20 Palmer was widely criticized because it was thought that this decision had severely restricted the scope of the statutory exception. Also, the commentators foresaw
a resurgence of the confusion which had plagued the courts regarding the admissibility
of business records before the statutory reform. See, e.g., McCoRllUCK, EVIDENCE § 287,
at 604 (1954); Note, 56 HAR.v. L. REv. 458 (1942); Morgan, The Law of Evidence 194114
15

1372

MICHIGAN LAW

REvmw

[Vol. 61

Post-Palmer decisions by the circuit courts of appeals indicate a lack
of agreement as to the circumstances necessary for a given accident report
to be admitted into evidence under the Federal Business Records Act.
For example, the Second Circuit has envisaged no difficulty in admitting
accident reports where they are introduced against the maker,21 while the
Third Circuit has denied admission of such reports in like circumstances.22
The Third Circuit, however, has admitted accident reports compiled by
the Government when it was not a party to the litigation.28 Decisions by
the District of Columbia Circuit indicate a view that the Palmer decision
allows the admission of only those records which are compiled on a dayto-day basis.24 Such an interpretation would seem, in effect, to require the
exclusion of all accident reports. Although the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
have stated that the "character of the records" as an "earmark of their
reliability" is the determining £actor, these courts have decided that the
nature of accident reports is such that they are inadmissible under the
Federal Business Records Act.25 In contrast to these somewhat mechanical
approaches, previous decisions of the Second Circuit have indicated that,
in applying the Palmer decision, a number of £actors are to be considered
by the trial court in determining the question of admissibility of a given
accident report.26
In the principal case the opinions by Judges Waterman and Moore
appear to follow the approach previously espoused in decisions by the
Second Circuit. Unlike the situation in some earlier cases in that court,
the accident report involved in the principal case was not compiled by
- the party against whom it was to be introduced, nor was it compiled by a
disinterested third party. Judge Waterman was, however, especially influenced by two other £actors: first, the report was not prepared for the
purpose of litigation in a court of general jurisdiction, but rather to accompany the seaman's claim for statutorily fixed compensation; secondly,
the maker of the report testified at the trial and was available for cross1945, 59 HARV. L. REv. 481 (1946); Comment, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 920 (1948); 17 So. CAL.
L. REv. 165 (1944). But cf. Polasky &: Paulson, supra note 7, at 343-45; 43 CoLUM. L. REv.
392 (1943).

21 Korte v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R, 191 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
868 (1951); Pekelis v. Transcontinental &: W. Airlines, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). Of course, these reports could have been introduced as an
admission against interest without resorting to the Federal Business Records Act. See
McC01u.i:1cK, op. cit. supra note 20, §§ 253-57.
22 Nuttal v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1956); Masterson v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
182 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1950).
23 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
24 See Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
25 See Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Sharples
Chems., Inc., 209 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1954).
26 See Puggioni v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 286 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1961), where the court
indicated that Palmer gave wide discretion to the trial courts in the matter of admitting
accident reports under the Federal Business Records Act.
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examination.2 7 In addition, the report was "regular" in the sense that
similar reports were made in all accident cases involving an application
for compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.
If one accepts as correct the double test of regularity and trustworthiness
applied by Judges Waterman and Moore, it becomes important to determine what factors should be influential in deciding whether or not to
admit a given accident report. As to the aspect of "regularity," the fact
that similar reports were compiled by the entrant after every accident
would be an important consideration.28 Moreover, it should be ascertained
whether a standard procedure was followed in compiling the particular
report which is being offered in evidence. In cases where the accident
report of a private business is sought to be introduced, a court should
inquire into whether such reports are normally made throughout tlie industry. With regard to "trustworthiness," certainly reports which are being
entered against the maker should be allowed in most cases,29 and, in addition, it would seem that most accident reports compiled by a third party
should likewise be admitted. In Palmer the Supreme Court indicated that
all reports should be carefully scrutinized in order to ascertain if their
primary function was to aid in litigation. According a great deal of weight
to such a factor would seem questionable, since accident reports, like any
business record, will frequently give one of the parties an advantage in
litigation, as one primary purpose for compiling most records is to assist
in or to avoid the litigation of disputes. On the other hand, if the report
was compiled at a time when a lawsuit was obviously anticipated, this
would definitely be a relevant consideration. The experience and capability of the person who compiled the report may also be indicative of its
trustworthiness. Illustratively, a report of an automobile accident might
be more trustworthy if prepared by a police officer30 rather than by a
private citizen. A test which would require consideration of the above
factors in ascertaining the trustworthiness of accident reports offered under
the Federal Business Records Act would do much to effectuate the purpose
27 This factor has influenced the Second Circuit in a previous decision. See Central
R.R. v. Jules S. Sottnek Co., 258 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
The fact that the maker is available for cross-examination may not be as significant as
Judge Waterman indicates, because cross-examination in federal courts is limited to
matters raised on direct. Thus, if the entrant merely testifies that he made the report,
cross-examination might be of little aid to opposing counsel. See McCORMICK, op. cit.
supra note 20, § 21.
28 Moreover, it would appear that a high degree of trustworthiness should be accorded to records which contain information pertaining to an accident, but are not
actual accident reports. For example, the Second Circuit admitted a ship's log into
evidence which branded the defendant as the aggressor in an assault case. See United
States v. Strassman, 241 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1957). But cf. principal case at 801 Gudge
Moore's opinion).
20 See note 22 supra.
so Police reports of auto accidents have generally been held admissible, so long as
the report is made from a police officer's own knowledge and not from what others have
told him. See Gencarella v. Fyfe, 171 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1948); McWilliams v. Lewis, 125
F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Cf. McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co., 198 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1952).
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of the act while at the same time protecting the courts from evidence of
questionable veracity.a1
Perhaps the real solution to the problem of the admissibility of accident reports in federal courts lies in corrective legislation. That confusion reigns in this area of the law is amply demonstrated by the splits
among the courts of appeals as well as by the three opinions in the principal case, each of which apparently represents a defensible viewpoint.
The variety of interpretations may be attributable to the Supreme Court's
decision in Palmer, or to the inconclusive language of the act itself. Hopefully, Congress might be persuaded to consider legislation dealing specifically with the admission of accident reports into evidence, and thereby
clearly indicate its intent with reference to this problem. Otherwise, it
seems dubious that any degree of unanimity on this question can or will
be attained.
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.

31 An alternative solution to the problem presented by the principal case would be
to admit all accident reports into evidence and allow the trial court to comment freely
on the factors which would affect the weight of such evidence. Such a policy would
strictly comply with the admonition in the Federal Business Records Act that all circumstances pertaining to the making of the record other than its regularity will affect
its weight, but not its admissibility. See principal case at 799; Note, 56 HARv. L. REv.
458, 469 (1942).

